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Following the emergence of a novel strain of inﬂuenza A(H1N1) inMexico and the United States in April 2009,
its epidemiology in Europe during the summer was limited to sporadic and localised outbreaks. Only the
United Kingdom experienced widespread transmission declining with school holidays in late July. Using
statistical modelling where applicable we explored the following causes that could explain this surprising
difference in transmission dynamics: extinction by chance, differences in the susceptibility proﬁle, age
distribution of the imported cases, differences in contact patterns, mitigation strategies, school holidays and
weather patterns. No single factor was able to explain the differences sufﬁciently. Hence an additive mixed
model was used to model the country-speciﬁc weekly estimates of the effective reproductive number using
the extinction probability, school holidays and weather patterns as explanatory variables. The average
extinction probability, its trend and the trend in absolute humidity were found to be signiﬁcantly negatively
correlated with the effective reproduction number — although they could only explain about 3% of the
variability in the model. By comparing the initial epidemiology of inﬂuenza A (H1N1) across different
European countries, our analysis was able to uncover a possible role for the timing of importations (extinction
probability), mixing patterns and the absolute humidity as underlying factors. However, much uncertainty
remains. With better information on the role of these epidemiological factors, the control of inﬂuenza could be
improved.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction
A novel strain of inﬂuenza A H1N1 (A(H1N1)v) was ﬁrst identiﬁed
in Mexico and the Southern United States in April 2009. The virus
rapidly spread to Europe being ﬁrst identiﬁed in Spain and the United
Kingdom (UK) on 27th April (Health Protection Agency et al., 2009;
Sierra Moros et al., 2010). Other countries in Europe (particularly
those with frequent ﬂight connections to Mexico and the US) started
conﬁrming cases shortly afterwards(Belgian working group on
inﬂuenza A(H1N1)v, 2009; Gilsdorf et al., 2009; Hahné et al., 2009;
Health Protection Agency et al., 2009; New inﬂuenza A(H1N1)
investigation teams, 2009; Surveillance Group for New Inﬂuenza A
(H1N1) Virus Investigation and Control in Spain, 2009; Surveillance
Group for New Inﬂuenza A(H1N1) Virus Investigation in Italy, 2009).
The epidemiology in Europe in the late spring and summer was
typiﬁed by sporadic cases and isolated self-limiting outbreaks linked
to importations (see Fig. 1), with one apparent exception. A major
generalised epidemic of A(H1N1)v occurred in the UK in June and July
which only declined once schools closed for the summer holidays at
the end of July (Baguelin et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2010). No such
major epidemic was reported elsewhere in Europe until the autumn,
duringwhich time the UK had its secondwave of infection.Whilst one
would expect an inﬂuenza variant to have a rather similar transmis-
sion potential in these countries we show that the observed
epidemiology suggests a much higher transmissibility (measured by
the average number of secondary cases per case) of A(H1N1)v during
summer 2009 in England than elsewhere in Europe. We then explore
a series of epidemiological hypotheses that might explain the
differences. First, these could be explained by chance: i.e. that the
epidemiological parameters were similar across countries but the
epidemic took off in England and not in other countries by chance.
Second, the difference could be explained by a difference in the
susceptibility proﬁle. Third, the difference could be explained by a
difference in the age distribution of imported cases. Fourth,
differences in contact patterns could have favoured the spread in
age groups whichmix with the more susceptible age groups. Fifth, the
difference could be explained by a difference in implemented control
measures. Sixth, the difference could be explained by a late school
closure relative to the time of the introduction in the UK. Seventh, the
weather patterns (pressure, relative and absolute humidity, temper-
ature,? and wind speed) might have played an inﬂuential role. This
paper aims to test these hypotheses against available data from 12
European countries. In order to do so, we analyse data on the time of
symptom onset of conﬁrmed cases over a period from April 2009 to
October 2009, and data on the control measures that were
implemented, school holidays, and weather. This analysis of trans-
mission patterns of A(H1N1)v during the early phase of infection in
Europe helps to build a better understanding of how inﬂuenza spreads
and what factors may have inﬂuenced the different epidemiological
patterns observed.
Materials and methods
Reported cases
In each of the 12 countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, England, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slova-
kia,? and Spain) datawere collected on laboratory conﬁrmed A(H1N1)v
Fig. 1. The intensity of clinical inﬂuenza like illness and acute respiratory infection activity in 2009 as reported by the European Inﬂuenza Surveillance Network. In most countries A
(H1N1)v was found to be the dominant type during this period. Low intensity here reﬂects no inﬂuenza activity or inﬂuenza activity at baseline level, medium: level of inﬂuenza
activity usually seen when inﬂuenza virus is circulating in the country based on historical data, high: higher than usual inﬂuenza activity compared to historical data and very high:
inﬂuenza activity is particularly severe compared to historical data.
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cases. The country-speciﬁc study period was deﬁned by the period
between the occurrence of the ﬁrst case of novel A(H1N1)v inﬂuenza
and the end of testing the vast majority of (ideally all) suspected cases
(as determined by local experts' opinion, which in most countries
corresponded to the date of change in policy from the recommondation
to test all cases (Health Protection Agency; Inﬂuenza A(H1N1)v
investigation teams et al., 2009; Italian Ministry of Health; Ministerio
DaDaude; Santa-Olalla Peralta et al., 2010; SierraMoros et al., 2010)) or
the reopening of schools after summer holidays if this occurred earlier.
In respect to the case deﬁnition (Table S1) a conﬁrmed case was
deﬁned as having a positive laboratory test by reverse transcription
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), viral culture or showing a four-
fold rise in inﬂuenza A(H1N1)v speciﬁc neutralising antibody titre from
a convalescent (generally collected 3–4 weeks after onset of illness) to
an acute sample (collected within 1 week after symptom onset in the
same individual). A suspected case was deﬁned as someone who
fulﬁlled the country-speciﬁc epidemiological and clinical criteria but
was not tested at the time of data collection for this analysis (England
29/07/2009, France 20/10/2009, all suspected cases were tested in the
other countries).
Data on conﬁrmed cases were used including information on: date
of reporting, date of illness onset, travel to an at-risk country within
the last 7 days prior to illness onset, gender and age where available.
In the UK only data from England were available for this analysis,
although Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales had similar epidemic
patterns in the summer of 2009 (Communicable Disease Surveillance
Centre Northern Ireland; Health Protection Scotland; National Public
Health Service for Wales).
Due to the absence of any data on the date of illness onset in
Luxembourg we assumed the reporting delay to be either zero or
1 day (equally likely). For all other countries the country-speciﬁc
reporting-delay distribution was obtained by ﬁtting a gamma
distribution to the observed data (Figure S1) and this was used for
imputing the date of illness onset for cases with only data available on
the date of report: for the calculation of the effective reproduction
number (the number of secondary cases generated by an average
primary case during its infectious period—“R”) sampling from this
distribution for cases with unknown infection date was included in
the bootstrap and for all other analysis such a case was divided across
possible dates proportionally to the distribution. For the few cases
with unknown importation status, this value was imputed (included
in the bootstrap for the calculation of R and divided amongst
imported/indigenous proportionally for all other analysis) using the
weekly likelihoods of a case being imported, calculated from the
information available. For the weeks without any information the
likelihood from the previous week was assumed, starting at week 1
with 100% imported.
Reproduction number
The effective reproduction number was calculated from the
laboratory conﬁrmed cases by an extended version of a method
described by Wallinga and Teunis (2004) which uses the serial
interval to assign a most likely source case for each case that was not
imported and therefore estimates the average number of secondary
cases caused by an individual (effective reproduction number). This
included a correction for censoring as well as bootstrapping with re-
sampling the unavailable data on importation status and date of
illness onset. The serial interval distribution employed was con-
structed through artiﬁcial count data of 1,4,7,6,4,2,1,1 observations
(representing weights) of a serial interval of length 0 to 7 days
respectively. It was inspired by unpublished early estimates of the
serial interval in the UK to follow a gamma distribution with mean of
3.88 days, variance of 2.77 days and an offset of 1 day (this estimate
was slightly reﬁned later to a mean of 2.51 days and a variance of
1.55 days without offset (Ghani et al., 2009)). To test for a difference
between the R estimates of England compared to the other countries
we examined the overlap between the conﬁdence intervals, which is a
rather conservative test (Schenker and Gentleman, 2001). To avoid
setting up multiple data-sharing agreements, program code (written
in R version 2.11.0) was distributed to each country to perform the
analysis on its own data. Outputs from the program code were shared
and analysed centrally.
Potential regulators for transmission
Chance
The probability of an outbreak of A(H1N1)v in a susceptible
homogenously mixed population becoming extinct (extinction
probability) was approximated by a branching process (Karlin and
Taylor, 1975). Given the daily number of importations for each
country we assumed R to be similar to levels observed in England and
negative binomially distributed. We calculated the daily extinction
probability for each country for a set range for R and 3 scenarios of the
variance to mean ratio representing transmission dynamics to be
little, moderately and highly dependent on super spreading events
(see Supplementary data).
Relative susceptibility of adults and the elderly compared to children
Age-susceptibility proﬁles were estimated for each country using
the age-mixing information on both all contacts and close contacts
obtained from Mossong et al. (2008). For countries that did not
participate in that study, an averaged mixing pattern was assumed.
The expected age distribution of cases was derived by a simple
multiplication of the age distribution of the observed infected cases
Table 1
Overview of the countries' study period ends, the dates for closure of the ﬁrst school due to summer holidays, the total number of conﬁrmed cases, the respective percentage of
imported cases and those with missing information on their travel background and the estimated effective reproduction number before onset of summer holidays.
End of
study
period
First day
of summer
holidays
Conﬁrmed
cases
Imported Unknown
travel
history
R before
summer
holidays
Belgium 13/07 01/07 126 61.3% 0% 0.19 (0.15–0.2)
Bulgaria 23/10 22/05 127 37.6% 0.6% NA
England 23/06 22/07 4847 9.9% 0% 1.14 (1.11–1.17)
France 30/06 02/07 335 71.7% 1.9% 0.31 (0.29–0.39)
Germany 01/08 25/06 9193 79.6% 0% 0.52 (0.51–0.54)
Italy 30/06 05/06 146 86.3% 2.7% 0.08 (0.08–0.11)
Luxembourg 14/09 16/07 227 61.2% 15.4% 0.16 (0.11–0.16)
Netherlands 16/08 03/07 636 72.5% 4.3% 0.4 (0.38–0.42)
Portugal 20/08 09/07 2240 27.9% 0.2% 0.22 (0.21–0.24)
Romania 14/09 12/06 329 79.4% 0% 0.31 (0.31–0.32)
Slovakia 03/08 01/07 78 88.5% 0% 0.06 (0.06–0.06)
Spain 28/06 19/06 746 20.4% 0.3% 0.83 (0.82–0.83)
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with the country speciﬁc mixing matrix. The expected and the
observed number of secondary cases were divided into aged b20 y
(children), aged ≥20 y but b60 y (adults) and aged ≥60 y (elderly).
The relative susceptibility of adults vs. children and elderly vs. adults
was estimated by the relative standardised incidence ratio in children,
adults and elderly (for further details see Supplementary material).
Bootstrap techniques were used to estimate conﬁdence bounds. These
included resampling of the observed age distribution from a Poisson
distribution and the uniform sampling of one of the known mixing
matrices for those countries where no such information exists. A
random effects meta-analysis following the approach of DerSimonian
and Kacker (2007) and using the log of the mean susceptibility
estimates and its standard deviation was done to get a random effects
pooled estimate of the relative standardised incidence ratio.
Age distribution of imported cases
The difference in age distribution (in 5-year age bands) of imported
cases before the country speciﬁc start of the summerholidays of England
compared to each other country was tested employing a two-sided
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.
Mixing patterns
Differences in expected age-distribution of secondary cases caused
by an average infected person for England compared to Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were assessed using
the data from a recently conducted contact survey (Mossong et al.,
2008). We took 10,000 bootstrap samples for each countries' contact
matrix (all contacts) and compared the respective dominant eigenvec-
tors (which, scaled to 1, represents the targeted age-distribution of
secondary cases) in the Euclidian norm. Empirical p-values were
calculated.
School holidays
In most countries the start of the summer holidays depends on
the type of school and region. To simplify matters we deﬁned
country-speciﬁc summer holidays as the period between the ﬁrst day
of school closing and the ﬁrst day of school reopening (For Germany
and the Netherlands this is a major simpliﬁcation). Data on school
closure for summer holiday was obtained from the respective sites
(Feiertagskalender; Roditelli.bg). The study period (P) was divided
into term-time (P1) and, where data were available, the vacation
period (P2).
Weather
Daily data on weather patterns (pressure, relative humidity,
temperature and wind speed) were obtained from the Wolfram
server using Mathematica 7. Unweighted countrywide daily averages
were obtained from half hourly measures for all cities inhabited by
more then 100,000 people. In Luxembourg this was extended to all
cities. The Antoine equation (Antoine, 1888) was used for calculating
absolute humidity.
Regression analysis
An additive mixed model analysis (Wood, 2006) was used to
model the country-speciﬁc estimates of the effective reproductive
number (on a log-scale) with time whilst accounting for the
heterogeneity between and homogeneity within countries using a
country-speciﬁc random intercept and an autoregressive correlation
structure. The explanatory variables were: the cumulative number of
importations, the extinction probability (R=1.1, variance to
mean=1), the absolute and relative humidity, the temperature, the
air pressure, the wind speed, whether or not schools were closed for
summer holidays and the number of days since the beginning of
summer holidays (to represent the successive closure in different
regions for some countries). In addition to a nonparametric model for
the country-speciﬁc evolution of the effective reproductive number
over time, more speciﬁcally cubic regression splines, the model was
augmented with explanatory variables thought to be predictive for
Fig. 2. Timeline of infection for the participating countries and their respective study
periods. Cases coloured in dark grey are imported and the ones in light grey are
indigenous. The vertical dotted line indicates the start date of summer holidays.
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the observed differences in country-speciﬁc proﬁles. The Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) was used to select the best model
amongst an extensive set of candidate models based on various
combinations of the country-speciﬁc nonparametric time effect and
the explanatory variables, balancing goodness of ﬁt and model
complexity (see Supplementary material for further detail).
Results
The country-speciﬁc end of the study period is provided in Table 1
along with the start date of school holidays and the total number of
cases included in the analysis. Whilst in Bulgaria the ﬁrst case
occurred after the start of summer holidays in France and England the
end of testing of all suspected cases was prior to the start of the
summer holidays (Fig. 2). Case deﬁnitions differed only slightly by
country (Table S1).
Whilst in most countries the majority of cases reported travel to a
high-risk country within 7 days before symptom onset, in England over
90% of the caseswere infected via in-country transmission. In the period
before the country-speciﬁc onset of summer holidays we estimated the
average number of secondary cases per case in all countries to be well
below1 (Table 1).Only in EnglandRwas signiﬁcantlyhigher. The course
of the reproduction number estimates over time for the 12 different
countries during the summer of 2009 (Fig. 3) reveals that, with two
exceptions, R was well below 1 (most remained below 0.5) the whole
time until early August with some sporadic transmission clusters
appearing afterwards (Figure S2). Spain had a reproduction number
higher than 1 around mid-May — which corresponded to a few
outbreaks associatedwith amilitary campand several schools, but these
did not result in ongoing community transmission. In England (and
elsewhere in the UK (Ghani et al., 2009)) the reproduction number
initially appeared to be around 1 but by mid-May was greater than 1,
leading to increasing chains of transmission. Baguelin et al. (2010) show
that the reproduction number remained above 1 until schools were
closed at the end of July (the apparent decline in the reproduction
number in the middle of June in our estimates shown in Fig. 3 is likely
due to a decline in reporting efﬁciency as case-based reporting started to
cease).
The recommendations for containment measures to limit the
spread of the initial A(H1N1)v cases were broadly similar amongst the
countries (i.e. containment efforts in England were not disparate from
the others). Most countries offered antiviral treatment for all
conﬁrmed cases as well as antiviral prophylaxis for close contacts
(Table S2). Only minor differences in recommendations for social
distancing were reported. Using school closures to reduce the spread
of A(H1N1)vwas rarely used in all countries except England (about 70
closures until 23rd of June) and France (N4 in June).
The age distribution of imported cases before summer holidays
was similar across Europe (Figure S3 and Table S3) with only the
Netherlands and Spain being signiﬁcantly different than England. In
Spain about 75% of the imported cases prior to summer school
holidays were 20–30 years of age which results in a lower proportion
of b20 year olds as well as N30 year olds than was observed in the UK.
In all countries the majority of imported cases occurred in the 20–
40 years old population with few imported cases in the other age
groups. The expected age-distribution of secondary cases (as
calculated from a contact survey in 2005/06) in England was not
signiﬁcantly different to those in Italy and the Netherlands (p:0.26
and 0.35). However, we found differences comparing England to
Luxembourg (pb0.05), Belgium (pb0.05) and Germany (pb0.01)
which are most apparent in an expected higher proportion of
secondary cases of age 5–14y in England (Figure S4).
In all countries with enough cases to estimate whether there was a
signiﬁcant difference in susceptibility between adults (between 20–
60 years) and children (b20 years), children were more susceptible
(Fig. 4). The pooled estimate of relatively susceptibility of adults vs.
children was 0.56 (0.46–0.69) assuming transmission to occur through
two way conversational contacts (as reported in Mossong et al., 2008)
and 0.69 (0.58, 0.84) through physical contacts only. As suggested
elsewhere (Miller et al., 2010) we found the elderly to beneﬁt from a
better protection than other age groups. The pooled estimate of relative
susceptibility of elderly vs. adults was 0.23 (0.16–0.32) assuming
transmission through conversational contacts and 0.23 (0.16–0.33)
through physical contacts only. Neither for adults nor for the elderly
does England appear to be an outlier, with its susceptibility proﬁle being
not signiﬁcantly different from pooled estimates.
We evaluated the likelihood of chance alone driving the observed
difference in epidemiology, i.e. that the reproduction number actually
was at similar or slightly lower levels as observed in England, but that
outbreaks linked to importations terminated by chance in all other
countries. Mechanisms that increase the probability of extinction are
low numbers of secondary infections (i.e. if R≤1 an outbreak will have
an extinction probability of 1) and a high contribution of super
spreading events to the overall transmission. Whilst the average
number of secondary infections in England and Wales until summer
was estimated to be well above 1.1 (Baguelin et al., 2010; Ghani et al.,
2009) in large countries other then England with a relatively high
number of importations (Spain, France, Germany and the Netherlands),
the probability that the chains of transmission would have terminated
by chance given any true reproduction number ≥1.1 was calculated to
be essentially zero by the middle of June for our low and medium
scenario of variance to mean ratio (i.e. 5 or less). Even assuming the
scenario of super spreadersplayingamajor role in transmission the joint
probability of not observing a major epidemic in any large European
country other than England by the middle of June (i.e. before school
holidays in most countries) and presuming R≥1.1 in each country
during that time would be smaller than 0.03 (joint probability on June
15th for France, Germany, Italy and Spain given the ratio of variance to
Fig. 3. The effective reproduction number (weekly aggregated) during the summer in the participating countries until the end of July when most in countries school holidays had
started (see Figure S4 for the full time course); the dashed line indicates P2 (summer holidays) and the solid one P1 (no school holidays). The respectively coloured shaded area
corresponds to the 95% conﬁdence bounds.
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mean equals 25 and R=1.1). Even in countries with few importations
(mainly small countries and those with low rates of travel with North
America), it is highly unlikely that they would have escaped a major
epidemic by the end of July had the reproduction number actually been
in excess of 1.1 (assuming low–medium variance to mean ratios (see
Fig. 5)). By the end of June the joint probability of all countries in this
analysis other than England not experiencing a major epidemic was
smaller than 10−4 for R≥1.1 in all three transmission scenarios and it
would have needed an R as low as 1.04 for the extinction probability to
exceed 0.05.
We regressed the weekly aggregated effective reproduction
number in the different countries using a large set of country-speciﬁc
explanatory variables (extinction probability, school holidays and
several weather patterns). Only the extinction probability and the
absolute humidity (Figure S5) were retained in the model based on
the AIC criterion (Table S4). Since both the extinction probability and
absolute humidity are time varying covariates, each of the two
variables was replaced by two new variables separating the country-
speciﬁc average and trend (for further information see Supplemen-
tary material). A residual analysis showed no multicollinearity
amongst these variables and time. The ﬁnal model explained 60.5%
of the overall variability in the reproduction number (with 3% being
explained by the variables in the model and the rest by spline effects)
and showed a signiﬁcant negative effect of the average extinction
Fig. 4. The point estimates (PE) and their 95% conﬁdence intervals for the estimated relative susceptibility of adults (≥20 and b60 years) to children (b20 years) and of elderly
(≥60 years) to adults (top to bottom), using all contacts (A) and only physical contacts (B) as reported by a recent contact survey(Mossong et al., 2008). Countries named in grey did
not take part in the study and therefore an average mixing pattern was assumed.
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probability (pb0.001), the trend of the extinction probability
(pb0.01) and the trend in absolute humidity (pb0.05) whereas the
average absolute humidity was not retained in the ﬁnal model based
on the AIC criterion (Fig. 6). The nonparametric country-speciﬁc time
effects were shown to be signiﬁcant for Bulgaria, England, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania and Spain expressing a non-
linear evolution over time.
In the last weeks of the study period an increasing amount of
suspected cases in England and France were no longer tested and
presumed to be infected with A(H1N1)v. In our analysis we included
only the conﬁrmed cases but did some sensitivity analysis including
the presumed cases. This showed no difference in the age-distribution
and susceptibility and only minor differences in the weekly R
estimates without affecting the general outcome (Figure S6).
Discussion
Theemergenceof thenovel inﬂuenzaA(H1N1)v inMexicoand theUS
was followed by only sporadic outbreaks limited in size and associated
with imported cases across Europe in the late spring and summer of 2009
with theUKbeing the only exception. Thiswas observed in the European
ILI/ARI surveillance (Fig. 1). From mid-July until September many
countries reported cases returning from various Mediterranean holiday
regions. Spanishdata suggests that these cases arose from local outbreaks
conﬁned to tourist areas rather than reﬂecting widespread transmission
in the resident populations of holiday-destination countries. Our
estimates for the effective reproduction number based on laboratory-
conﬁrmed cases conﬁrm that in the late spring and summer of 2009,
transmission of novel inﬂuenza A(H1N1)v was not sustained across
Europe, with the exception of England.
Although there are differences in the reporting of inﬂuenza-like-
illness across Europe, our analysis focussed on laboratory-conﬁrmed
cases during the period of initial spread in each country. The laboratory
and epidemiological deﬁnitions employed were broadly consistent
across countries. Furthermore, we focus on the reproduction number
which relies on the relative differences of reported cases over time
rather than the absolute differences and is therefore relatively robust to
varying levels of reporting between countries, although it is sensitive to
short term alterations in reporting behaviour.
We found no evidence that the containment strategy (represented
through antiviral treatment, school closures and social distancing) in
England was less rigorous than in all of the other countries. Therefore
the observed differences in transmission in England (and the rest of
the UK) and other countries are unlikely to be solely the consequence
of differences in containment, as they were broadly similar across the
countries in this analysis, although there is no information available
on the actual public compliance (Ferguson, 2007). Moreover, we show
that contact patterns are similar in the UK to elsewhere in Europewith
only small but signiﬁcant differences between England and some of
the countries. However, no such data exists for half of the studied
countries so much uncertainty remains. It has become increasingly
clear that children are particularly important for the spread of A
Fig. 5. Left column: time varying extinction probability for R=1.1 and variance to mean=1,5,25 (top to bottom) given the imported cases of the different countries. The lines
become dashed when school holidays started. Right column: joint extinction probability of all countries but England in early summer according to different values of the
reproduction number with variance to mean being 1,5,25 (top to bottom).
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(H1N1)v (see, for instance, Fraser et al., 2009). Our analysis suggests
that there does not appear to have been a different susceptibility
proﬁle in England compared with other countries, nor was the age
distribution of imported cases before the summer holidays different;
however, these ﬁndings could have been altered by varying age-
dependent reporting rates. Also the emergence of a different and
more transmissible A(H1N1)v virus in England is unlikely to have
occurred (Fereidouni et al., 2009).
Furthermore, it is improbable that differences in importation
patterns on their own were sufﬁcient to generate this anomaly. Since
the extinction probability is converging to 1 for R approaching 1
extinction by chance can never be ruled out for all RN1 but we show
that for similar and even lower levels than observed in the UK the
probability of the chains of transmission simply fading out by chance
in all other countries was vanishingly small.
Even though school closures due to summer holidays were found
to have substantially reduced the ongoing spread of A(H1N1)v in
England (Baguelin et al., 2010) our analysis could not detect a
signiﬁcant role for summer holidays on the reproduction number.
Possible factors which might have contributed to that ﬁnding include:
1) assessing the impact of school closure not being possible for some
countries, as the holiday period was outside the study period, notably
in England; 2) the impact of vacations on reducing the average
number of secondary infections in the absence of sustained spread (as
for all countries but England) might be outweighed by stochastic
effects and therefore hardly detectable; 3) alterations in reporting
coinciding with school holidays might also have inﬂuenced the
analysis. Neither the regression analysis nor a second method we
employed (see Supplementary data; Table S5) could detect any
consistent changes in R after the start of the summer holiday. It seems
apparent that transmission limiting factors were already in place
before summer holidays in all countries except the UK.
The only factors that appeared to be signiﬁcantly related to the
reproduction number from the regression analysis (although not
retained for all scenarios in the sensitivity analysis — see Supple-
mentary data) were the average and trend in the extinction
probability if the reproduction number was 1.1 and the trend in
absolute humidity, though the latter failed to fully explain it. The
extinction probability is correlated with the cumulative number of
importations (though the cumulative number of imported cases was
not found to be signiﬁcant when substituted into the model for the
extinction probability), so a possible explanation for the negative
association between the extinction probability and R could be a
threshold corresponding to a number of importations needed to
overcome the initial stochasticity. Alternative explanations could
include that intervention strategies are more effective when there are
only a few importations. The negative association between the trend
in absolute humidity (AH) and R is in line with the recent ﬁndings
from Shaman et al. (Shaman and Kohn, 2009; Shaman et al., 2010)
who suggested a negative effect of absolute humidity on both
transmissibility and the survival of the inﬂuenza virus and found an
association of the daily variation in absolute humidity with the onset
Fig. 6. The effective reproduction number (weekly aggregated) evolving in time in the participating countries (black dashed line) with predicted proﬁles based on additive mixed
model (blue solid line for P1 and red solid line for P2) with 95% conﬁdence intervals (grey shaded region).
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of seasonal wintertime inﬂuenza outbreaks. Our ﬁnding that the
baseline (average AH for each country) was not signiﬁcantly
associated suggests that the relation between R and AH may not
represent a physical one but rather a change in human behaviour
responding to changes in AH.
Taken together these results tentatively suggest that a possible
explanation for the difference in epidemiology was that the UK had a
relatively large number of early importations, transmission dynamics
which were slightly favouring the spread in school-aged children and
a relatively low level of absolute humidity. Perhaps widening this
analysis to other countries and regions across the globe would help
reﬁne or refute these hypotheses. The program code (using the freely
available language R) can be requested from the corresponding author
and would enable other interested researchers to estimate these key
parameters from the basic data set which was used in this paper. This
could, therefore, help to build up a larger database on which questions
about transmissibility of inﬂuenza can be tested. The code could also
prove useful for analysing future inﬂuenza outbreaks.
This study highlights the fact that our current understanding of the
transmission of inﬂuenza, in terms of distribution of susceptibility
within the population and observed contact patterns assuming equal
effectiveness of controlmeasures doesnot fully account for the observed
differences in the initial epidemiology of inﬂuenza A(H1N1)v in Europe.
Further understanding of the precise mechanism behind such an
association is crucial to help us predict the future spread of inﬂuenza
more accurately and to design more efﬁcient means to mitigate its
impact.
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